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Paul Formosa and Catriona Mackenzie raise an important question: to what degree 
are Kant’s and Aristotle’s ethics compatible with each other? To answer this question, 
they examine the synthesis of Kantian and Aristotelian insights offered by Martha 
Nussbaum:
Nussbaum attempts to integrate distinct and seemingly opposed Aristo-
telian and Kantian elements into her conception of human dignity. The  
Aristotelian elements involve linking dignity to species specific norms of 
flourishing and to the neediness and vulnerability of our embodied animal lives. 
The Kantian element involves the idea of each person as an end in themselves. 
Although Nussbaum draws on the Kantian conception of dignity, she also 
characterises her conception of dignity in contrast to what she refers to as the 
Kantian conception of the person. But does Nussbaum successfully integrate 
these two seemingly opposed conceptions of dignity into one coherent account 
and is her representation of the Kantian conception of dignity accurate?1
On the nature of dignity, Formosa and Mackenzie may overstate the contrast 
or tension between Aristotle and Kant. After all, are not the species-specific norms 
of flourishing for human beings inextricably tied to our rationality and freedom, in 
other words, to what makes us beings who are ends-in-themselves? Is not one of our 
fundamental needs as human beings to develop our rational faculties and our potential 
for moral virtue, so that we can do our duty and live in accordance with reason? No 
human being can fully flourish unless he lives a life that expresses both rationality 
and freedom by respecting other human beings and reciprocally being respected by 
other human beings as an end-in-himself. 
1. Paul Formosa and Catriona Mackenzie, “Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities 
Approach to Dignity,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17.5 (November 2014): 876, doi: 
10.1007/s10677-014-9487-y.
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A greater tension between the Kantian and Aristotelian accounts lies in their 
answers to the question, who has dignity? Both Kant and Aristotle can be inter-
preted as advocating an ethics of exclusion, which holds that not all but only some 
human beings have dignity. However, both philosophers may also be interpreted as 
expressing a more inclusive and universalist view that all human beings have basic 
dignity. These interpretations are not equally plausible. Considered as a historical 
figure, Aristotle does not ascribe equal dignity to all human beings, because slaves 
and women did not have equal dignity with free men. However, a neo-Aristotelian 
like Alasdair MacIntyre can justify the dignity of each human being.2 Kant ascribes 
dignity to all human beings because all human beings have a rational nature, which 
characteristically develops into an immediately exercisable capacity for rational 
activity and free choice.3 However, neo-Kantians like Mary Anne Warren deny the 
equal dignity of all human beings.4
Formosa and Mackenzie call attention to an important distinction between 
what they call status dignity and achievement dignity. Status dignity belongs to the 
class of individuals who are due respect, have basic rights, and are part of the moral 
community. An individual either has or does not have this status. On the other hand, 
achievement dignity is measured by degrees. An individual might have achievement 
dignity while riding a ski lift, have less achievement dignity while struggling awk-
wardly to get off the lift, and have still less achievement dignity when losing control 
on the ski slope and crashing face-first into a snow drift:
I might have a high degree of achievement dignity when I do something digni-
fied, such as respond with fortitude to a heavy loss, but lose (or lose a degree 
of) my achievement dignity when I do something undignified, such as make a 
fool of myself in public by losing my cool and unjustifiably abusing someone. 
In contrast, I don’t lose my status dignity when I make a fool of myself in 
public (even if doing so is undignified), and my status dignity attaches itself 
primarily to me rather than to my beings and doings, such as my responding 
with fortitude to a heavy loss.5
Their last point is crucial. Status dignity is an essential trait of an individual 
rather than a trait linked to his actions. Put in metaphysical terms, status dignity 
is not an accidental characteristic, such as what I happen to be doing right now or 
what I have done in the past. Status dignity is an essential characteristic like being 
alive or being a human being, something that I do not lose until I lose my very exis-
tence. To have status dignity is akin to being the son of a king and queen. Nothing 
can reverse royal lineage, for the son always has regal status by virtue of his royal 
2. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues (Peru, IL: Open Court, 1999). 
3. Patrick Kain, “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 47.1 (January 2009): 59–101, doi: 10.1353/hph.0.0083.
4. Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Monist 57.1 
(December 19, 2014) 43–61, doi: 10.5840/monist197357133.
5. Formosa and Mackenzie, “Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities Approach,” 877.
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parents. However, if a prince acts in foolish, dishonorable, and demeaning ways, he 
lacks regal behavior, or achievement dignity. 
In her article “Respect for Human Dignity as ‘Substantive Basic Norm,’” 
Mary Neal takes up a different aspect of the debate and challenges the claim that 
dignity can be reduced to autonomy: “First, if autonomy and dignity were essentially 
synonymous, then logically, only autonomous individuals could be said to possess 
dignity.”6 No one holds that an individual must actually be exercising autonomy to 
deserve respect—think, for example, of a sleeping doctor, a dead-drunk lawyer, or a 
politician undergoing surgery. Moreover, small children and mentally handicapped 
adults lack autonomy in its Kantian sense of a self-given rational law yet are respected 
by every sound legal system. 
Neal’s challenge critiques a straw man inasmuch as no one thinks it is neces-
sary to actually exercise autonomy to have either status or achievement dignity. 
The current discussion is between those who think that dignity depends on having 
the capability to immediately exercise autonomy, or a related characteristic, and 
those who hold that status dignity is enjoyed by anyone with a root capacity or nature 
oriented toward reason. Neal leaves both these views unaddressed. 
Second, Neal writes,
I can violate your autonomy without violating my own, and fail to respect 
your autonomy while my own autonomy remains completely unaffected. By 
contrast, if we understand dignity as a moral relationship (per Maier) and the 
community as a party to that relationship (per Oliver) we can then understand 
dignity as attaching to human beings and their communities in a reflexive way, 
so that when I violate your dignity, I am simultaneously failing to respect my 
own dignity and offending against the “community of dignity.”7 
This contrast does not really work, however, because it uses dignity ambiguously. 
When someone violates another person’s dignity, the perpetrator’s achievement dig-
nity is degraded because he makes himself less worthy of moral praise from others. 
Yet the perpetrator retains his status dignity as a being who deserves fundamental 
respect. For this reason, even the most horrible mass murderers are due fair trials 
and legal representation as well as humane treatment after conviction, because their 
status dignity remains intact, an intrinsic characteristic lost only in death.
At another point in her essay, Neal turns to the topic of human dignity and rights:
In international human rights discourse and jurisprudence, “human dignity” 
is conceived of as inherent and inalienable: we are all born with dignity, and 
no-one and nothing can remove it from us. But if dignity is inherent, I do not 
need to acquire it; and if it is inalienable, I need no protection against its loss. 
If a “right to dignity” is a right to something everybody already has and cannot 
lose, it makes no sense.8
6. Mary Neal, “Respect for Human Dignity as ‘Substantive Basic Norm,’” Interna-
tional Journal of Law in Context 10.1 (March 2014): 28, doi: 10.1017/S1744552313000359, 
original emphasis.
7. Ibid., 29, original emphasis.
8. Ibid., 32.
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This passage misinterprets the meaning of an inalienable right, at least as it is 
classically understood. When the authors of the Declaration of Independence spoke 
of the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, they did not 
mean to imply that murder, enslavement, and oppression are impossible. Rather, an 
inalienable right is one that cannot be renounced. I cannot change murder and slavery 
into permissible acts by authorizing another person to murder or enslave me. I cannot 
waive my right to equal protection under the law and make my legal status like that 
of a plant. Because status dignity is inherent, human beings cannot relinquish their 
basic human rights and degrade themselves to mere things to be used. Status dignity 
is the basis for inalienable rights, which can be violated but not voluntarily given up.
But what exactly is the relationship betweeb rights and dignity? Peter Schaber’s 
article “Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder” critically 
evaluates arguments that claim human rights cannot be derived from human dignity. 
One such argument is that dignity is an inherently religious concept and, therefore, 
cannot justify human rights in a secular society. Schaber points out that “non-believers 
might disagree with this justification; but if the relevant religious beliefs were true, 
they would simply be wrong. The fact that the non-believers were not convinced 
would be no reason to reject dignity as a justificatory basis for human rights. It would 
only reveal the cognitive limits of the non-believers.”9 A disagreement between 
persons of faith and persons of no faith cannot be adjudicated by a simple supposi-
tion that in such cases the views of nonbelievers are to be adopted. Why should a 
believer accept atheism by default any more than an atheist should unequivocally 
accept theism? If it is true that every human being has inherent worth regardless of 
age, disability, or health condition, then a denial of this belief is untrue. Belief in an 
untruth reveals cognitive limitations, as Schauber points out. Some religious con-
victions cannot be justified by philosophical arguments or scientific evidence. The 
doctrine that God is three divine Persons is a classic example. Other religious beliefs 
can be justified through philosophy and science. For example, recent psychological 
studies confirm the value of forgiveness.10 
Is the inherent dignity of all human beings a distinctly religious belief like 
the Trinity, or is it akin to believing that forgiveness helps human flourishing? The 
affirmation of human dignity is found clearly in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. 
The creation story in Genesis teaches that each human being is a member of God’s 
royal family. Ancient pagan creation accounts suggest that only the king’s family 
was made in the image and likeness of the gods. Genesis, by contrast, affirms that 
Adam and Eve were both made in God’s image and became the origin of the human 
family. Genesis articulates in narrative form the insight that all human beings have 
royal lineage and thus have status dignity. 
 9. Peter Schaber “Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder,” 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17.1 (February 2014): 156, doi 10.1007/s10677-013 
-9427-2.
10. See Christopher Kaczor, The Gospel of Happiness (New York: Image Books, 
2015), 115–132.
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Of course, universal status dignity does not need to rest on the text of Genesis, 
and can be defended without appealing to revelation of any kind, much less sectar-
ian religious beliefs.11 Only Roman Catholics believe in the infallibility of the Pope 
as defined by the First Vatican Council. By contrast, the principle that “all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” is espoused 
by people of many different faiths. A “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” was adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.12 This proposition 
finds acceptance among atheists, agnostics, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, 
Buddhists, and followers of innumerable other religions. If dignity as understood by 
the United Nations somehow counts a religious belief, it is hard to see what kind of 
ethical or political principles could count as nonreligious. Obviously, the fact that 
belief in human status dignity is found in the Bible should not count against its truth 
or its enforcement in a legal system any more than the Biblical passage “You shall 
not steal” delegitimizes laws prohibiting theft. 
It appears that Schaber rejects the proposition that all human beings have basic 
rights: “I think that people in a permanent vegetative state should be cared about. But 
do they have the rights which adults have? They might have a moral status which 
does not give rise to rights; and this might be due simply to the fact that it would 
make no sense to ascribe rights to beings who are in principle unable to exercise 
them.”13 Indeed, people in a PVS entirely lose their right to drive a car because of 
the limitations of their cognitive state. Similarly, such people cannot exercise their 
right to vote. Even if a proxy were to vote for him, the person in a PVS would not 
be the one actually exercising his right to vote. However, other rights surely are 
maintained even by people in a PVS. Rape is intrinsically evil, and everyone has 
a right not to be raped. If a woman in a PVS maintains the right not to be raped by 
virtue of the value of her bodily integrity, then a fortiori she also maintains the right 
not to be intentionally killed, the most serious violation of her bodily integrity pos-
sible. To exercise some rights, like voting or driving, an agent must knowingly and 
willing do something. Other rights, such as the right not to be raped or the right not 
to be murdered, do not require that the one having the right do anything consciously 
and knowingly. 
At times, Schaber’s article reflects a lack of familiarity with recent research 
about human dignity:
One can only justify the rights humans have as humans by referring to 
properties which are essential properties of human beings; it is not enough, 
11. See Patrick Lee, “Moral Status and the Margins of Human Life,” American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 60.1 (May 2015) 105–120, doi: 10.1093/ajj/auv008; and S. Matthew Liao, 
“The Basis of Human Moral Status,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7.2 (2010): 159–179, doi: 
10.1163/174552409X12567397529106.
12. UN General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 
1948, preamble.
13. Schaber, “Human Rights and Human Dignity,” 158.
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simply to refer to the fact that they are human beings. But then it is unlikely 
that the justificatory work will be done by properties shared by all beings 
who are human in a biological sense. It might be the case that we all share 
certain genes. But do we have a right not to be degraded, because we have 
these genes? This is highly implausible. The property we need to share has to 
be relevant for the justification of human rights. This property has, however, 
not yet been identified. And this is the reason why all justifications of human 
rights which refer to our humanity are unable to account for the idea that all 
humans have certain rights.14
One can claim that no successful justification for universal human rights has 
been given. But it is inaccurate to claim that no justification has been offered at all. 
In recent years, numerous accounts have been proposed. For example, Matthew Liao 
claims that all human beings have basic dignity and human rights because they have 
the genetic basis for moral agency.15 Robert George, Christopher Tollefsen, Patrick 
Lee, and many others in the natural law tradition defend the same view on the basis 
of the shared rational nature of all human beings.16 This inclusive view also has dis-
tinguished historical proponents, including Immanuel Kant.17 In 1776, the founders 
held these truths to be self-evident truths that all human beings are created equal and 
have inalienable rights. They asserted, in other words, that the inherent dignity of 
every human being is a first principle, a foundation not in need of further justification, 
but rather a beginning point of reasoning in the moral and political order. Perhaps 
these or other attempts fail, but Schaber provides no reason for us to think so.
chrisTopher kAczor 
14. Ibid.
15 . Liao, “Basis of Human Moral Status,” 159–179; and S. Matthew Liao, “The Genetic 
Account of Moral Status: A Defense,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9.2 (2012): 265–277, 
doi: 10.1163/174552412X625718.
16. Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life
(New York: Doubleday, 2008); and Lee, “Moral Status and the Margins of Human Life.”
17. Kain, “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status.”
